Being no one (Record no. 565013)
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fixed length control field | 02045 a2200241 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20220530161650.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 220526b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER | |
ISBN | 9780262633086 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE | |
Transcribing agency | IIT Kanpur |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER | |
Classification number | 153 |
Item number | M569b |
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--AUTHOR NAME | |
Personal name | Metzinger, Thomas |
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Being no one |
Remainder of title | the self-model theory of subjectivity |
Statement of responsibility, etc | Thomas Metzinger |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
Name of publisher | The MIT Press |
Year of publication | 2004 |
Place of publication | Cambridge |
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
Number of Pages | xii, 699p |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | A Bradford Book |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc | According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds. |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical Term | Cognitive neuroscience |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical Term | Self psychology |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical Term | Consciousness |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Koha item type | Books |
Withdrawn status | Lost status | Damaged status | Not for loan | Collection code | Home library | Current library | Date acquired | Source of acquisition | Cost, normal purchase price | Full call number | Accession Number | Cost, replacement price | Koha item type |
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General Stacks | PK Kelkar Library, IIT Kanpur | PK Kelkar Library, IIT Kanpur | 06/06/2022 | 102 | 2576.82 | 153 M569b | A185715 | 3650.00 | Books |