000 02182 a2200217 4500
003 OSt
020 _a9780262046527
040 _cIIT Kanpur
041 _aeng
082 _a519.3
_bD954s2
100 _aDutta, Prajit K.
245 _aStrategies and games [2nd. ed.]
_btheory and practice
_cPrajit K. Dutta and Wouter Vergote
250 _a2nd. ed.
260 _bMIT Press
_c2022
_aCambridge
300 _axxxiv, 672p
520 _aThis widely used introduction to game theory is rigorous but accessible, unique in its balance between the theoretical and the practical, with examples and applications following almost every theory-driven chapter. In recent years, game theory has become an important methodological tool for all fields of social sciences, biology and computer science. This second edition of Strategies and Games not only takes into account new game theoretical concepts and applications such as bargaining and matching, it also provides an array of chapters on game theory applied to the political arena. New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines are now included. The authors map out alternate pathways through the book for instructors in economics, business, and political science. The book contains four parts: strategic form games, extensive form games, asymmetric information games, and cooperative games and matching. Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings. Applications and case studies include OPEC, voting, poison pills, Treasury auctions, trade agreements, pork-barrel spending, climate change, bargaining and audience costs, markets for lemons, and school choice. Each chapter includes concept checks and tallies end-of-chapter problems. An appendix offers a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, which underpins game theory.
650 _aGame theory
650 _aEquilibrium (Economics) -- Game theory
700 _aVergote, Wouter
942 _cBK
999 _c567307
_d567307